fight the power/nuclear reduction and strategy

[COMANDER COON]

as we all know health care passed all the stimulus have done nothing and now this administration wants to screw up are national defence and jeopardize this nation with this treaty that will disable us to use nukes against a nation or enemy that dose not poses nukes now that dose not included a cyber attack nor a chemical warfare so three fourths the nation can be sick and the rest being invaded on are home land and we cant use are power to destroy are enemies that's wrong THE USA should NEVER take an option off the table  

[DanskiWolf]

What's the point of nuking a country with no nukes when the US could easily decimate it with conventional weapons?  

[Lord Bitememan]

DanskiWolf

What's the point of nuking a country with no nukes when the US could easily decimate it with conventional weapons?

Deterrence value. The best way to protect your population against state-level attacks of this nature is to provide a strong enough disincentive to a state engaging in it. This was not just the policy of the US either, this was the stated policy of France under Chirac and continues under Sarkozy. Neither policy addresses the most tangible threat of WMD terrorism, that of NGOs, but it's not a good idea to start peeling back the deterrence policies against states either.

Suppose, for example, that the reform movement in Iran really starts to gain momentum, and it becomes clear to the clerics that they will soon be ousted from power. So, the clerics get to calculating. Under the old scenario, hitting the US with a chemical weapon attack would have resulted in a glow in the dark Tehran. Under the new scenario, however, the US is precluded from hitting Iran with nukes. Instead, a large conventional bombardment will come, which will serve the joint purposes of rallying the unaligned behind the regime and it will force reformists to take cover just like the rest of the population. The US would have to fight the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who are no slouches on the battlefield, and there's a possibility that a fundamentalist insurgency will wear us down and force us to abandon an invasion or occupation. Surviving elements of the regime could be in a prime position to hold power once the pieces are picked up. Sure, it's a longshot scenario, but do we really want to reduce the negative payout of a rational decision such that we invite scenarios like this? It increases the risk that desperate powers might resort to attacks of this nature.  

[DanskiWolf]

Lord Bitememan

Deterrence value. The best way to protect your population against state-level attacks of this nature is to provide a strong enough disincentive to a state engaging in it. This was not just the policy of the US either, this was the stated policy of France under Chirac and continues under Sarkozy. Neither policy addresses the most tangible threat of WMD terrorism, that of NGOs, but it's not a good idea to start peeling back the deterrence policies against states either.

Surely the unparalleled military and economic muscle of the US is enough of a deterrant.

Quote:

Suppose, for example, that the reform movement in Iran really starts to gain momentum, and it becomes clear to the clerics that they will soon be ousted from power. So, the clerics get to calculating. Under the old scenario, hitting the US with a chemical weapon attack would have resulted in a glow in the dark Tehran. Under the new scenario, however, the US is precluded from hitting Iran with nukes. Instead, a large conventional bombardment will come, which will serve the joint purposes of rallying the unaligned behind the regime and it will force reformists to take cover just like the rest of the population. The US would have to fight the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who are no slouches on the battlefield, and there's a possibility that a fundamentalist insurgency will wear us down and force us to abandon an invasion or occupation. Surviving elements of the regime could be in a prime position to hold power once the pieces are picked up. Sure, it's a longshot scenario, but do we really want to reduce the negative payout of a rational decision such that we invite scenarios like this? It increases the risk that desperate powers might resort to attacks of this nature.

If the mullahs felt their regime was threatened, they'd attack the US whether nuclear retaliation was on the table or not. What would the clerics have to gain? 72 virgins in the paradise. What would the clerics have to lose? Nothing. In the nuclear scenario, however, those who fight for reform and democracy would also be wiped out in a nuclear hellfire along with millions of civilians.  

[Lord Bitememan]

DanskiWolf

Lord Bitememan

Deterrence value. The best way to protect your population against state-level attacks of this nature is to provide a strong enough disincentive to a state engaging in it. This was not just the policy of the US either, this was the stated policy of France under Chirac and continues under Sarkozy. Neither policy addresses the most tangible threat of WMD terrorism, that of NGOs, but it's not a good idea to start peeling back the deterrence policies against states either.

Surely the unparalleled military and economic muscle of the US is enough of a deterrant.

US conventional and economic supremacy has been undisputed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demonstration of it's capacity in the 1991 Gulf War. Since that time it has failed as a deterrent in at least four instances, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. That's a pretty poor track record for conventional deterrence. WMD retaliatory capacity, however, has a very solid track record. No two nuclear armed nations have ever exchanged fire against one another, nor has any nuclear state suffered a state organized chemical or biological attack (NGO attacks are another matter). Even Hitler declined to use chemical warfare on the battlefield for fear of allied chemical retaliation.

Quote:

Quote:

Suppose, for example, that the reform movement in Iran really starts to gain momentum, and it becomes clear to the clerics that they will soon be ousted from power. So, the clerics get to calculating. Under the old scenario, hitting the US with a chemical weapon attack would have resulted in a glow in the dark Tehran. Under the new scenario, however, the US is precluded from hitting Iran with nukes. Instead, a large conventional bombardment will come, which will serve the joint purposes of rallying the unaligned behind the regime and it will force reformists to take cover just like the rest of the population. The US would have to fight the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who are no slouches on the battlefield, and there's a possibility that a fundamentalist insurgency will wear us down and force us to abandon an invasion or occupation. Surviving elements of the regime could be in a prime position to hold power once the pieces are picked up. Sure, it's a longshot scenario, but do we really want to reduce the negative payout of a rational decision such that we invite scenarios like this? It increases the risk that desperate powers might resort to attacks of this nature.

If the mullahs felt their regime was threatened, they'd attack the US whether nuclear retaliation was on the table or not. What would the clerics have to gain? 72 virgins in the paradise. What would the clerics have to lose? Nothing. In the nuclear scenario, however, those who fight for reform and democracy would also be wiped out in a nuclear hellfire along with millions of civilians.

You assume that the clerics aren't rational state actors. They are. First of all, the 72 virgins thing is a Salafist doctrine, not a Shiite doctrine. Secondly, they've more than demonstrated their capacity to maneuver within and play the international system over the nuclear issue. An irrational actor would not have been capable of doing this, only a rational one, who knows how to game payoff, would have achieved success so far. Nuclear destruction wipes out everything you have. The clerics have a vested interest in having a country to rule, even if they have to put it through pain a tribulation to keep it. Tribulation is preferable to destruction. So yes, no rational state actor would openly cross a line that results in total annihilation. On the other hand, using war abroad to quell disturbance at home has a very long history. A conventional war with the US verifies to the Iranian public the clerical admonishments about the United States. Why else do you think we were so reluctant to openly back the reform movement in the election dispute? Or why else would we be so reluctant to use military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons? Neither of these actions would be unpopular, taken under US auspices, in the Arab nations. None of them want Iran to have nuclear weapons either. The reason is because an attack on Iran would strengthen the regime.  

[COMANDER COON]

Lord Bitememan

DanskiWolf

Lord Bitememan

Deterrence value. The best way to protect your population against state-level attacks of this nature is to provide a strong enough disincentive to a state engaging in it. This was not just the policy of the US either, this was the stated policy of France under Chirac and continues under Sarkozy. Neither policy addresses the most tangible threat of WMD terrorism, that of NGOs, but it's not a good idea to start peeling back the deterrence policies against states either.

Surely the unparalleled military and economic muscle of the US is enough of a deterrant.

US conventional and economic supremacy has been undisputed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demonstration of it's capacity in the 1991 Gulf War. Since that time it has failed as a deterrent in at least four instances, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. That's a pretty poor track record for conventional deterrence. WMD retaliatory capacity, however, has a very solid track record. No two nuclear armed nations have ever exchanged fire against one another, nor has any nuclear state suffered a state organized chemical or biological attack (NGO attacks are another matter). Even Hitler declined to use chemical warfare on the battlefield for fear of allied chemical retaliation.

Quote:

Quote:

Suppose, for example, that the reform movement in Iran really starts to gain momentum, and it becomes clear to the clerics that they will soon be ousted from power. So, the clerics get to calculating. Under the old scenario, hitting the US with a chemical weapon attack would have resulted in a glow in the dark Tehran. Under the new scenario, however, the US is precluded from hitting Iran with nukes. Instead, a large conventional bombardment will come, which will serve the joint purposes of rallying the unaligned behind the regime and it will force reformists to take cover just like the rest of the population. The US would have to fight the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who are no slouches on the battlefield, and there's a possibility that a fundamentalist insurgency will wear us down and force us to abandon an invasion or occupation. Surviving elements of the regime could be in a prime position to hold power once the pieces are picked up. Sure, it's a longshot scenario, but do we really want to reduce the negative payout of a rational decision such that we invite scenarios like this? It increases the risk that desperate powers might resort to attacks of this nature.

If the mullahs felt their regime was threatened, they'd attack the US whether nuclear retaliation was on the table or not. What would the clerics have to gain? 72 virgins in the paradise. What would the clerics have to lose? Nothing. In the nuclear scenario, however, those who fight for reform and democracy would also be wiped out in a nuclear hellfire along with millions of civilians.

You assume that the clerics aren't rational state actors. They are. First of all, the 72 virgins thing is a Salafist doctrine, not a Shiite doctrine. Secondly, they've more than demonstrated their capacity to maneuver within and play the international system over the nuclear issue. An irrational actor would not have been capable of doing this, only a rational one, who knows how to game payoff, would have achieved success so far. Nuclear destruction wipes out everything you have. The clerics have a vested interest in having a country to rule, even if they have to put it through pain a tribulation to keep it. Tribulation is preferable to destruction. So yes, no rational state actor would openly cross a line that results in total annihilation. On the other hand, using war abroad to quell disturbance at home has a very long history. A conventional war with the US verifies to the Iranian public the clerical admonishments about the United States. Why else do you think we were so reluctant to openly back the reform movement in the election dispute? Or why else would we be so reluctant to use military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons? Neither of these actions would be unpopular, taken under US auspices, in the Arab nations. None of them want Iran to have nuclear weapons either. The reason is because an attack on Iran would strengthen the regime.

I completely agree with you and you know we nuke one uranium enrichment plant and a few military bases and they will be fast to negotiate trust me
(i don't think there is a problem an ICBM cannot solve JK)